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IDEA THEFT AND INDEPENDENT CREATION:
A RECIPE FOR EVADING
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Jonathan Richard Sandler*
Ideas are valuable, especially in Hollywood, and those who rely on
their ideas for income need protection. Because ideas are not protected
by federal copyright law, the solution in California has been to protect
idea disclosure with implied-in-fact contracts. A common defense to a
claim of idea theft is the independent-creation defense. This defense
permits an idea recipient to escape liability by showing that he did not
use a plaintiff’s idea but instead used an idea from an independent third
party. The problem with this defense, however, is that it fails to
recognize the possibility that an idea recipient could actually be using
the idea from both the idea purveyor and the independent third party
simultaneously. As a result, defendants can wrongfully evade one valid
implied-in-fact contractual obligation by demonstrating that they
simply have a second contract. This Note proposes a change to the
analysis that courts currently apply in implied-in-fact contract claims,
which will remedy this practice and ensure better protection of idea
purveyors’ rights.

* J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 2013. BA, Columbia University, 2005. Note and
Comment Editor, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 46. Many thanks to the editors and
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their time and thoughtful feedback. Special
thanks to my husband, Joseph, for his continued support and to Howard B. Miller and Professor
Bryan D. Hull for their academic guidance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ideas have value. Every day hundreds, if not thousands, of
people develop ideas and attempt to sell them to entertainment
companies.1 Such people are known as idea purveyors.2 Given that
idea purveyors rely on the sale of their ideas for their livelihood, the
law affords them protection in the event that someone uses one of
those ideas but refuses to pay for it.3 Though not protected by
copyright4 or recognized as property5 in California, ideas are
protected through either express or implied-in-fact contracts.6
Disputes arise, however, when two independent parties contract
with the same idea recipient7 and disclose seemingly identical ideas.
The logical assumption would be that one could determine which
purveyor’s idea was actually used—and which was discarded—thus
establishing to whom payment is owed. Such logic is absent from the
current body of California law, however.8 California law affords
protection to ideas but does not require novelty or concreteness;9
therefore, two idea purveyors could conceivably contract with the
same company for the sale of the “same” idea. Because the ideas are

1. Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose
Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 714 (2006); see generally Glen L. Kulik, The Idea
Submission Case: When Is an Idea Protected Under California Law?, 32 BEVERLY HILLS B.
ASS’N J. 99 (1998) (discussing the different protections afforded idea purveyors in the
entertainment industry).
2. See Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Ct. App. 1970); Aileen Brophy, Whose
Idea Is It Anyway? Protecting Idea Purveyors and Media Producers After Grosso v. Miramax, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 507 (2005).
3. Miller, supra note 1, at 711; see Jay Rubin, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of
the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 661, 697
(2006).
4. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.01 (2011).
5. Id. § 19D.02; Camilla M. Jackson, “I’ve Got This Great Idea for a Movie!” A
Comparison of the Laws in California and New York that Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 52 (1996).
6. Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
7. “Idea recipient” is an industry term for a person to whom an idea purveyor pitches his
idea. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06; Miller, supra note 1, at 724.
8. See infra text accompanying note 193.
9. Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 334; Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App. 1968);
43 CAL. JUR. 3D Literary and Artistic Property § 15 (2011); Kulik, supra note 1, at 105; Celine
Michaud & Gregory Tulquois, Idea Men Should Be Able to Enforce Their Contractual Rights
Considerations Rejecting Preemption of Idea-Submission Contract Claims, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 75, 77 (2003).
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identical, there is no way for a finder of fact to consistently
determine which idea was actually used to create the new work.
However, idea recipients have developed what appears to be an
effective defense to claims of unlawful use—the independentcreation defense. This defense, in theory, enables an idea recipient to
show that he has used one idea and not another.10 The problem is that
the independent-creation defense is misplaced in contract law, and
even when it is applied correctly, it fails to acknowledge and uphold
an idea purveyor’s contractual rights.11 Further, California courts
have misapplied this defense in a way that threatens to undermine the
law of ideas and deny purveyors any and all protection.12 Simply put,
the independent-creation defense permits an idea recipient to destroy
one valid contract by merely showing that he has contracted with
another party for the disclosure of the same idea.13
This Note summarizes the present state of California ideaprotection law and attempts to resolve the inconsistencies that the
independent-creation defense has created. Part II describes the state
laws that protect ideas, as federal law offers no such protection. Part
III explains the most common method of state protection for idea
disclosure—the implied-in-fact contract—focusing on the element of
actual use. Part IV analyzes the development of the independentcreation defense in the contract context and highlights the ways in
which it has been both misinterpreted and misapplied. Part V offers
two proposals to reshape the independent-creation defense so that it
better protects idea recipients who have engaged in no misconduct
and does not deny relief to purveyors deserving recovery. The first
proposal suggests changes to the analysis that courts currently apply
to implied-in-fact contract claims, while the second proposal,
instead, recommends changes to the effect of the independentcreation defense and the remedies to which one is entitled. Finally,
Part VI concludes that adopting the first proposed solution, alteration

10. See infra text accompanying notes 44–51.
11. THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS
§ 15:6 (3d ed. 2011).
12. See infra Part IV. It is not only the idea purveyor whose rights are afforded inadequate
protection by the independent-creation defense; idea recipients’ rights are vulnerable as well.
13. See infra Part IV.
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of the courts’ analysis, will result in the best protection for all parties
involved in idea-submission claims.
II. STATE LAWS, NOT FEDERAL LAWS,
PROTECT IDEAS
Generally, federal statutes protect products of the mind—for
example, patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret, and unfair
competition statutes.14 Federal law does not, however, protect
ideas.15 Instead, state laws offer such protection.16 Copyright, the
standard federal protection for artistic works, explicitly denies ideas
any protection.17 However, courts have recognized that ideas fixed in
a tangible medium are within the subject matter of copyright, despite
not being protected by it.18 Nevertheless, the Copyright Office has
made it clear that the intent of federal Copyright Law is to not
protect general ideas or outlines.19 As a matter of policy, Congress
has decided not to extend federal protection to ideas.20 Thus, those
seeking to recover in idea-submission disputes have historically
relied on various state legal theories to protect their ideas.21 In recent

14. Jackson, supra note 5, at 47; Miller, supra note 1, at 717.
15. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.01[A]; Miller, supra note 1, at 718; see Brian
Casido, Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.: New Standard Needed for Determining
Actual Use, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 335 (2011).
16. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.01[A]; Miller, supra note 1, at 718; see Brian
Casido, Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.: New Standard Needed for Determining
Actual Use, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 335 (2011).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2010).
18. See Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2011).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
19. Jackson, supra note 5, at 49.
20. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.03[A][1].
21. See id. § 19D.02; Jackson, supra note 5, at 50; Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas,
Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 21 (1994) (listing property, quasi-contract, express contract,
implied-in-fact contract, and confidential relationship as formerly applied legal theories).
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years contract law has emerged as the most “significant remaining
state-law protection for literary or artistic ideas.”22
Further, recent Ninth Circuit opinions have made clear that the
1976 Copyright Act does not preempt state contract claims for the
disclosure of ideas.23 Thus, in California, idea submissions24 are most
often protected by contract.25 The legal obligation to pay for an idea
may be found in either an express or implied-in-fact contract.26 The
only difference between the two is the manner in which they are
formed—the former is created in words, while the latter is created by
the parties’ conduct.27 Most often, claimants bring idea-submission
claims based on the implied-in-fact contract theory.28
III. DESNY CLAIMS:
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS
FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF IDEAS
The elements of a breach-of-implied-in-fact contract claim for
idea disclosure, commonly referred to as a Desny claim,29 are firmly
established in California law. In order for a plaintiff to recover, he
must show that (1) he had an idea, (2) he disclosed his idea for sale
to the defendant, (3) the use of the idea was clearly conditioned on
the obligation to pay the plaintiff, (4) the defendant voluntarily
accepted the idea disclosure, (5) the defendant actually used the idea,
and (6) the idea had value.30 Although each of these elements
22. Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Sobel, supra
note 21, at 21.
23. See, e.g., Montz, 649 F.3d at 979 (9th Cir. 2011); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383
F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
24. “Idea Submission” is a term of art, referring to the disclosure of an idea for a television
show, movie, or product for sale in a commercial context. Jackson, supra note 5, at 47 n.1.
25. See Michaud & Tulquois, supra note 9, at 75.
26. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.05.
27. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1621 (West 2011); Firchau v. Diamond Nat’l Corp., 345 F.2d
269, 274 (9th Cir. 1965); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 778–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Kulik,
supra note 1, at 106; Glen L. Kulik & Craig S. Berman, Implied-in-Fact Contracts in the
Entertainment Industry, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 10; Rubin, supra note 3, at 682; CAL. CIV. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 305 (2010).
28. Kulik & Berman, supra note 27, at 10.
29. A Desny claim is the name courts frequently use when referring to a claim for breach of
implied-in-fact contract for the disclosure of an idea. Allison S. Brehm, Creative Defense, L.A.
LAW., Sept. 2010, at 28; see, e.g., Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
2004); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
30. Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Grosso,
383 F.3d at 967 (listing the elements of a Desny claim); Desny, 299 P.2d at 270 (same);
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deserves in-depth discussion, this Note will focus only on the
element of actual use, for this is the element the independent-creation
defense addresses.
Actual use of an idea without payment to the idea purveyor
functions as the breach of contract in a Desny claim.31 It has
consistently been the most difficult element to prove in ideasubmission cases.32 This is largely because the plaintiff will rarely
have access to direct evidence of use and must therefore rely on
circumstantial evidence.33 In such cases, a plaintiff may establish an
inference of use by presenting evidence of (1) a similarity between
his work and the infringing work and (2) the defendant’s access to
the plaintiff’s work.34 This principle emanates directly from
copyright law, and a defendant may rebut this presumption by
presenting contradictory evidence, just as in the realm of copyright.35
If two works are so similar as to reach the standard of “striking”
similarity,36 then courts do not require a showing of access and
instead infer both access and actual use from the similarity of the
works.37 The inverse is not true, however. Notably, access alone
cannot give rise to an inference of use; some degree of similarity is
required.38 The degree of similarity between an allegedly stolen idea
and an allegedly infringing work is a question of fact for the jury to
determine.39
However, there is no requisite amount of similarity and access
that a plaintiff must demonstrate to gain an inference of actual use.
Jurisprudence has recognized that a substantial showing of evidence
Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2009)
(same); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 304 (Ct. App. 1984) (same); Blaustein v.
Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Ct. App. 1970) (same); Literary and Artistic Property, supra note
9, § 15 (same); SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6 (same); Kulik & Berman, supra note 27, at 10
(same).
31. Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No. B190025, 2008 WL 588932, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 5, 2008); SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6; Casido, supra note 15, at 336.
32. Casido, supra note 15, at 338.
33. Kulik, supra note 1, at 107.
34. Reginald, 2008 WL 588932, at *4; Kulik, supra note 1, at 100.
35. Benay, 607 F.3d at 630; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07.
36. “‘Striking’ similarities . . . are similarities of the kind that cannot be explained, in the
normal course of human events, by the possibilities of independent creation, coincidence or prior
common source.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][d].
37. Benay, 607 F.3d at 630; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][d].
38. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][b].
39. Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 968 (Cal. 1953).
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for one of these elements may compensate for a lack of evidence of
the other.40 This principle is referred to as the “inverse ratio rule.”41
It should be noted that the inverse ratio rule does not determine
liability; its role is limited to establishing the inference of actual
use.42 In both the contract and copyright context, actual use does not
instantly give rise to liability: the works must be substantially similar
to each other such that the amount of actual use is legally actionable,
rather than simply factual.43 Stated differently, one can use another’s
idea to a certain extent without incurring liability, but once the works
pass the threshold of being substantially similar, the author has
“used” another’s idea in an impermissible way.
IV. THE INDEPENDENT-CREATION DEFENSE
The independent-creation defense has become one of the
primary defenses against idea-submission claims.44 The defense
allows a defendant to overcome a claim, notwithstanding that the
plaintiff has made a showing of access and similarity, by
affirmatively proving that the similarity is coincidental and that no
actual use of the plaintiff’s idea has occurred because the defendant’s
project was independently created.45 Courts have recognized this
defense as a complete shield from liability.46 The rationale behind
this defense is that unlawful use is not possible “when the alleged[ly]
offending work was conceived independently of a plaintiff’s idea.”47
When mounting an independent-creation defense, the defendant
faces the burden of presenting evidence that is “clear, positive,
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be
disbelieved.”48 However, this is an ambiguous standard. As one court
40. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][c].
41. Id.; Lee S. Brenner, The Very Idea, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 33, 37.
42. Sobel, supra note 21, at 70.
43. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][c]; Sobel, supra note 21, at 70–71.
This, of course, assumes that the parties contracted for substantial similarity to trigger liability in
the first place, given that each contract’s terms are unique. Brenner, supra note 41, at 38.
44. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108; see Brehm, supra note 29, at 30.
45. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108.
46. Id.
47. Brehm, supra note 29, at 30.
48. Teich v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); see Hollywood
Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 534, 536 (Ct. App. 1982); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][2]; Kulik, supra note 1, at 108.
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stated, “whether such evidence [of independent creation] rises to the
level of being clear, positive and uncontradicted is itself a question to
be decided on a case-by-case basis.”49 California courts have
increasingly granted summary judgment in favor of a defendant that
meets this standard, finding there was no lawful use as a matter of
law.50 This approach severely increases the burden placed on the
plaintiff to establish his prima facie case.51
This is so because the application of the independent-creation
defense at the summary judgment stage of litigation is wholly
misplaced. There are multiple factual inquiries that would require a
jury’s determination before such a defense would even become
relevant.52 This defense does not become relevant or necessary until
after the court analyzes the plaintiff’s prima facie case.53 Within this
primary analysis, the court must find the existence of the implied-infact contract, its terms, and a breach resulting from uncompensated
use of the plaintiff’s idea. If the factual findings show that the
plaintiff did, in fact, have a valid contract and that it was breached,
this would create an issue as to the actual use of the plaintiff’s idea—
a factual question for the jury—rendering summary judgment
inappropriate.54 If one were to ignore this necessary analysis and
award summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the court would
essentially be holding that a defendant could exculpate himself by
simply telling an alternative story of creation for his work while

49. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108 (citing Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal.
Rptr. 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1966)).
50. Brehm, supra note 29, at 30.
51. Id. at 32.
52. First, the very existence of the contract is a factual inquiry, wherein a jury must decide
whether the plaintiff presented circumstances that qualify as those that form the implied-in-fact
contract. See Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 839 (Cal. 1995); Desny v. Wilder, 299
P.2d 257, 273–74 (Cal. 1956). Second, identifying the terms of the contract is also a factual
inquiry, wherein the jury must decide what degree of use the parties contracted for and whether
the contract required novelty. Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 650 (Ct.
App. 2007); see Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 86 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting) (“If the idea is not novel, the evidence must establish that the promisor agreed
expressly or impliedly to pay for the idea whether or not it was novel.”). Third, determining when
and if a breach of the contract occurred is also a fact-based inquiry best left to a jury. See Kurlan
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 968 (Cal. 1953).
53. See infra Part IV.B.2.
54. See infra Part IV.B.2, IV.B.4.
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under oath.55 Thus, this defense is neither as logically sound nor as
legally strong as it may appear to be at first blush.
A. The Development of the
Independent-Creation Defense
The seminal case in the development of the independentcreation defense was Teich v. General Mills.56 There, Jules Teich
filed suit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract when the
defendant allegedly stole his idea for a premium—a toy camera—in
a cereal box.57 The plaintiff’s idea was not novel—it was a kit for
making “sun pictures,” which was a common activity for children at
that time.58 The plaintiff contacted the defendant, General Mills, at
its Los Angeles Office seeking to sell his idea, which then directed
him to Otis Young of the San Francisco based Sperry Operations, a
division of General Mills.59 The plaintiff commenced communication
with Young on July 6, 1955, via written correspondence, following
up with a telephone call.60 Eventually, the plaintiff visited Young’s
office, where he “clearly conditioned” his disclosure of his idea on
receiving payment, and subsequently disclosed the idea to Young
and two other employees of General Mills who were present in the
meeting.61 At General Mills’s request, the plaintiff left some samples
at the office.62 From that day forward, however, Young completely
ignored the plaintiff.63 In January of 1956, the plaintiff saw a
package of the General Mills cereal “Trix” containing a “Magic Sun
Picture” premium inside and filed suit.64
General Mills’s story for the creation of its “Magic Sun Picture”
toy differed dramatically from the plaintiff’s narrative.65 General
Mills claimed that Herbert Valentine and Earl Radford of Valentine55. Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 90 P.2d 371, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][2].
56. 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
57. Id. at 629.
58. Id.
59. Id. Young was responsible for procuring premiums (toys) for Sperry products and
claimed he had no duty to report his activities to General Mills’ headquarters in Minneapolis. Id.
60. Id. at 630.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 632–33.
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Radford, a Kansas City advertising agency, had developed the toy
and had first written to James Street at General Mills’s Minneapolis
office with the idea on May 27, 1955.66 Thereafter, they
corresponded via mail, culminating with an offer to option
Valentine’s “Sun Pix” premium in a letter dated August 19, 1955.67
On January 16, 1956, General Mills purchased 6,250,000 “Sun Pix”
from Valentine.68
General Mills supported its story with the letters that it had
exchanged with Valentine, along with uncontradicted testimony from
Lowry Crites, the advertising manager for General Mills in the
Minneapolis office; James Street, the premium manager for General
Mills out of the Minneapolis office throughout 1955; and Herbert
Valentine, one of the independent creators of the toy who sold the
idea to General Mills.69 Additionally, the defendant offered six
letters that Valentine had written to other independent companies
during his development of his “Sun Pix” premium.70 It was clear that
the defendant firmly established a history for Valentine’s idea.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $35,000, but the judge granted the
defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,71
which the plaintiff appealed.72 The appellate court began its analysis
by stating that proof “of access and similarity raises an inference of
copying.”73 It went on to state explicitly that “[t]he weight to be
given the inference [of copying] as against direct evidence of
nonaccess and noncopying is a question for the trier of fact,” and that
66. Id. at 632.
67. Id. at 633.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 632–33.
70. Id. at 633–34. The first letter, dated June 1, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Walt
Disney Enterprises, inquiring about the use of Disney characters on their packaging; the second,
also dated June 1, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Holiday Plastics, Inc., inquiring about acetate
pricing; the third, dated June 9, 1955, was sent from Eastman Kodak Company to Valentine,
regarding a question Valentine had posed about packaging proof paper with a negative; the fourth
letter, dated June 13, 1955, advised Valentine that the trademark “Sun Pix” was available for use;
the fifth letter, dated June 22, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Highland Supply Company,
inquiring about printing on acetate photos; and the sixth letter, dated July 7, 1955, was sent from
Milprint, Inc. to Valentine, responding to a request for printing quotes on packaging materials. Id.
71. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is “[a] judgment entered for one party even
though a jury verdict has been rendered for the opposing party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
919–20 (9th ed. 2009).
72. Teich, 339 P.2d at 629.
73. Id. at 631.
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“[t]he implied finding of the jury of similarity is binding upon a
reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence.”74 The court
held that any differences between the plaintiff’s toy and the Trix
premium were insignificant,75 and neither side disputed the issue of
access.76 Therefore, the plaintiff had gained the inference of unlawful
use and had proven the breach of his implied-in-fact contract.77
However, the court did not stop its analysis there. It then
reasoned that the jury could not reject the defendant’s uncontradicted
testimony of independent creation.78 Upholding the lower court’s
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court held that while the
trier of fact was empowered to reject the testimony of a witness, even
though uncontradicted, there was an exception that prevented the
jury from “running away with the case.”79 The court explained that
the jury could not “indulge in [an] inference when that inference
[was] rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence of such
a nature that it is not subject to doubt in the minds of reasonable
men,” and that “[t]he trier of the facts [could] not believe
impossibilities.”80
The court then directly recognized the independent-creation
defense, asking whether “proof that there was no copying of [the]
plaintiff’s product [created] a complete defense, although the thing
actually used by [the] defendant was closely similar to the one which
[the] plaintiff had presented to it.”81 Based on the weight of
authority, the court held that the answer must be yes. 82 The court
closed with a quote from Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer,83 stating
that the jury “would have been more than stupid if [it] believed that
[it] could return a verdict for plaintiffs without a finding on [its] part
that appellants had used plaintiffs’ composition . . . .”84

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Mut. Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 108, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)).
Id. at 633.
See id. at 631–32.
See id. at 633.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id.
90 P.2d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
Teich, 339 P.2d at 635 (quoting Barsha, 90 P.2d at 376).
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On the surface, the Teich court’s reasoning seemed just, since it
concluded that the defendant did not use the plaintiff’s idea and,
therefore, owed him no payment.85 However, the court relied on a
lofty assumption in concluding as it did—that the defendant could
not have used both parties’ ideas.86 The court completely disregarded
the possibility that the defendant owed compensation to both the
plaintiff and the third-party creator, Valentine.87 Both parties
presented credible, well-supported stories of the creation of their
ideas and evidence sufficient to establish the formation of contracts
with General Mills.88 The court explicitly stated that the plaintiff had
successfully entered into an implied-in-fact contract with General
Mills, yet it then denied him his deserved contractual recovery when
the defendant presented a second source for the same idea.89
If a party is able to avoid its contractual obligation to pay
someone for a service by simply contracting with a third party for
that same service, how does that enable a person to rely on his
contract? It doesn’t. The Teich opinion runs counter to the strong
policy in favor of freedom of contract, which is aimed at encouraging
parties to engage in business more efficiently and to stimulate the
economy.90 Consider the following hypothetical: Dan is looking for
the best seeds to plant on his farm. Alan, a seed vendor anxious to
make a sale, promises to give Dan one hundred seeds in exchange for
Dan’s promise to pay him $9 for the seeds if Dan plants them. Bob,
another a seed vendor anxious to make a sale, promises to give Dan
one hundred of the same seeds in exchange for Dan’s promise to pay
him $10 for his seeds if Dan plants them. Two contracts have been
formed—the Dan-Alan contract and the Dan-Bob contract. Both
Alan and Bob give Dan their seeds, and Dan mixes all of the seeds
together in the same bucket. He then plants half of them and cannot
possibly determine whose seeds were planted. Dan then pays only
Alan and refuses to pay Bob for his seeds. The Teich opinion would
85. See id. at 634.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 56–70.
89. Teich, 339 P.2d at 630, 636.
90. See 1 B.E. WITKIN ET AL., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 323, at 351 (10th ed.
2005) (“[B]argaining and equality of bargaining . . . are the theoretical parents of the American
law of contracts.”).
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condone Dan’s actions because it stands for the proposition that Dan
could not possibly have contracted with two people for the same
seeds. This is both logically unsound and unjust, and Dan must fulfill
his contractual obligation to both parties or pay damages for
breaching the agreement between them. Simply proving the
existence of a duplicative contractual agreement does not negate the
validity of another; therefore, the independent-creation defense has
been misplaced in contract law since its very inception.
B. The Misapplication of the
Independent-Creation Defense
In addition to the policy and logic problems courts have created
by permitting such a defense to be used in the contract context,
courts have consistently misanalyzed idea-submission claims in its
wake. What follows is a detailed discussion of four cases on which
courts and scholars have relied to more firmly establish the
independent-creation defense. When closely scrutinized, however, it
becomes apparent that these cases actually misapply the law of ideas
and exacerbate the confusion surrounding contract rights in the
context of idea submission.
1. Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.
First, in Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,91 Bernice Mann filed
suit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, alleging that Columbia
Pictures stole her idea for a film titled “Women Plus” and used it in
its film Shampoo.92 Mann submitted her twenty-nine-page outline of
“Women Plus” in a sealed envelope to Caplan, an employee at
Columbia, through a mutual friend.93 The plaintiff never had any
direct contact with the Columbia employee, however.94 Further,
Caplan never delivered the outline to Columbia, but instead
submitted it to his own company, Filmmakers.95 Filmmakers sent
Mann a rejection letter for another manuscript but notably never

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 528.
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returned “Women Plus” and had no record of ever having received
it.96
Columbia mounted an independent-creation defense, asserting
that two independent writers, Beatty and Towne, had written
Shampoo in 1974 and submitted it to Columbia.97 It supported this
assertion with extensive evidence at trial showing that Towne created
the 161-page Shampoo screenplay in 1970 and had been working on
it since 1965.98 In order to support its nonreceipt of Mann’s
screenplay, Columbia juxtaposed the fact that its submission records
contained submission cards, author cards, title cards, and synopses
for Shampoo with the fact that it had no such cards for “Women
Plus.”99
At trial, the jury awarded Mann $185,000, but the defendants
successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.100
Upholding this ruling, the appellate court initially stated that any
similarities that Mann presented between her work and Shampoo
were without legal significance because “the trial record show[ed]
only that Towne and Beatty independently wrote the ‘Shampoo’
screenplay and script changes.”101 Further, it stated that although it
was possible that the jury inferred access and use from the
similarities between “Women Plus” and Shampoo, such an inference
“was rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence.”102
Completing its analysis, the appellate court held that because
Caplan never delivered the plaintiff’s outline to Columbia—as no
evidence supported such an allegation—the plaintiff failed to
establish access to her work.103 The court bluntly explained in its
holding that “[s]ince there was neither a submission of ‘Women
Plus’ to Columbia, nor any contact between the screenplay authors
and the people alleged to have possessed [the] plaintiff’s treatment,
there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.”104 The
96. Id. In addition to the rejection letter, he also returned a second script that Mann had
submitted along with “Women Plus” to Mann. Id.
97. Id. at 531.
98. Id. at 532.
99. Id. at 531–32.
100. Id. at 524.
101. Id. at 527.
102. Id. at 534.
103. Id. at 530, 532.
104. Id. at 535.
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plaintiff could not establish access based on “mere possibilities” of
submission.105 Additionally, the plaintiff had not established that the
independent creators, Beatty and Towne, had access to the plaintiff’s
work; therefore, the court concluded that a jury could not infer that
they used the plaintiff’s idea.106 Finally, the court refused to permit
an inference of both access and use based on the amount of similarity
that Mann had presented.107
The issue with the Mann opinion is that the court engaged in an
inverted analysis, which has caused the case to appear to stand for
much more than it actually does. Both Courts and commentators
have interpreted Mann as showing that evidence of independent
creation defeats a valid implied-in-fact contract claim.108 This
interpretation is erroneous, however, for all that the opinion truly
stands for is that when there is no showing of access, a plaintiff
cannot gain an inference of actual use.109 Therefore, there has been
no contractual breach, and the plaintiff cannot recover.110 All of the
analysis pertaining to the independent-creation defense in Mann is
irrelevant and would be more properly treated as dicta given the
plaintiff’s failure to establish an element of her prima facie case—
actual use.111 Because the court engaged in the independent-creation
defense analysis before addressing the validity of the plaintiff’s
initial claim, it performed an analysis that was unnecessary and has
since misled litigants, commentators, and judges who rely on this
case as law.112

105. Id. at 536.
106. Id. at 527.
107. Id. at 532 (“The access of Towne and Beatty to ‘Women Plus’ may only be inferred from
the similarities between plaintiff's treatment and the motion picture ‘Shampoo.’ Apart from these
similarities, Mann’s evidence is insufficient to infer defendants’ access to ‘Women Plus,’ as
plaintiff offers only speculation and the mere possibility that Caplan or Crutcher submitted the
missing treatment to Columbia’s story department.”).
108. Brehm, supra note 29, at 31.
109. See Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 535–36.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 532.
112. See, e.g., Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23,
2009); Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279 (Ct. App.
2007); Brehm, supra note 29, at 31–32.
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2. Hollywood Screentest of America v. NBC Universal, Inc.
A subsequent case in which a court misapplied the independentcreation defense was Hollywood Screentest of America v. NBC
Universal, Inc.113 There, James Pascucci, who had contacted Jeff
Zucker at NBC to pitch his idea for a show called “Hollywood
Screentest,” filed a breach-of-contract suit, claiming that NBC, in
conjunction with Silver Pictures, had unlawfully used his ideas in its
new show Next Action Star.114 Before disclosing his ideas, the
plaintiff obtained a signed confidentiality agreement from Zucker
stating that the plaintiff owned every idea he was going to disclose
except for those that were “generally available to the public.”115
After the plaintiff pitched a series of show ideas and marketing
concepts to NBC and spoke with various executives over the course
of several months, NBC ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s idea.116
NBC subsequently issued a press release for its new show, Next
Action Star, at which point the plaintiff filed suit, believing NBC had
stolen his idea.117
In its defense, NBC presented evidence that Next Action Star
had been independently created.118 This evidence established that
three different companies had together created Next Action Star over
the course of a year before they ever pitched it to NBC. 119 The court
noted that the plaintiff provided no evidence to contradict the
testimony of the employees of the three companies who allegedly
created the show independently.120
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.121 The appellate court began its
analysis by focusing on NBC’s independent-creation defense.122 It
explained that it had “found that NBC ha[d] successfully shown
undisputed evidence of independent creation by entities unrelated to

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279 (Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 281–83.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 290–91.
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NBC and unassisted by NBC.”123 The court then “look[ed] carefully
at [the] appellants’ evidence to determine whether they ha[d]
provided any evidence that call[ed] into question the evidence
supporting independent creation” and found that “they ha[d] not.”124
The court then briefly addressed the actual-use element of the
plaintiff’s claim, stating that the “[a]ppellants point[ed] to no
evidence that NBC actually used their ideas” but that they “ask[ed]
that [the court] draw inferences based on general similarities and
timing.”125 Such speculation was not sufficient to create a disputed
issue of fact.126
Upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the
court held that because NBC had presented undisputed evidence of
independent creation, the plaintiff’s causes of action could not
survive.127 Significantly, the court went one step further, stating that
the “[a]ppellants’ cause of action for an implied-in-fact contract for
payment in exchange for the use of ideas necessarily require[d] a
finding that NBC actually used [the] appellants’ ideas.”128 However,
“that element [wa]s negated by the uncontradicted evidence of the
independent creation of Next Action Star.”129 Accordingly, “the
cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract . . . fail[ed] as a
matter of law.”130
In Hollywood Screentest, the court erred twice in its analysis,
further confusing the validity and efficacy of the independentcreation defense. First, like in Mann, the court focused its initial
inquiry on the independent-creation defense, rather than focusing on
the strength of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.131 As the court held
later in the opinion, the plaintiff had failed to ever establish actual
use of his idea.132 This means that he never had a valid claim, and the
issue of independent creation was superfluous. Second, the court
omitted any real analysis of substantial similarity, presumably
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 291.
Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 290–91.
See id. at 292.
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because the evidence of similarity was so weak that the court did not
find it worth examining.
The problem with this approach is that the court needlessly
focused all of its attention on the defendant’s independent-creation
defense. Moreover, the court overstated its holding when it wrote
that “[use] is negated by the uncontradicted evidence of the
independent creation of Next Action Star.”133 This case should not be
interpreted to stand for this proposition. Rather, it should be read to
mean that, in the absence of an inference of actual use, there can be
no recovery under an implied-in-fact contract since the plaintiff
cannot prove any breach. The issue of independent creation is,
therefore, irrelevant in this context. The plaintiff’s claim failed as a
matter of law for only one true reason—he failed to state a prima
facie case.134 Had the plaintiff successfully established an inference
of use, he would have created a disputed issue of fact as to that
element and survived summary judgment.135
Unfortunately, there is additional language in this opinion that is
potentially subject to inaccurate interpretation. Specifically, the court
stated that “[b]ecause NBC ha[d] presented undisputed evidence of
independent creation, thus preventing a finding of use, none of [the]
appellants’ causes of action [could] survive.”136 This statement is
precariously open to misinterpretation. This language should stand
only for the proposition that, in the absence of an inference of actual
use, a defendant’s evidence of independent creation is undisputed.
Unfortunately, this language, taken at face value, seems to require
plaintiffs to create issues of disputed facts in the underlying facts of
the defendant’s independent-creation defense, which is an unfair
burden. Such language suggests that a court should require the
plaintiff not only to prove his claim but also to disprove the
defendant’s independent-creation theory, which is not an element of
an implied-in-fact contract claim.137 Stated differently, if a plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing of his claim, the burden should shift to
the defendant to prove its affirmative defense. If the defendant fails

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 293.
See id. at 292.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 30.
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to do so, then it loses. A plaintiff should not be required to disprove
the affirmative defense of independent creation, as this places the
burden on the wrong party. Thus, it should not function as a bar to a
plaintiff reaching a jury.
3. Kightlinger v. White
A California court recently applied the erroneous reasoning from
Hollywood Screentest in an unpublished opinion when it upheld
summary judgment for the defendant in Kightlinger v. White.138
There, Laura Kightlinger filed suit for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract against Mike White for using the ideas contained in her
screenplay, “We’re All Animals,” in his own screenplay, “The Year
of the Dog.”139 In late 2002 or early 2003, Kightlinger gave White a
copy of her screenplay, which he admitted to having read. 140 In late
2005, White wrote a similar screenplay.141 The defendant asserted
that he had not copied the plaintiff’s work but had instead used his
own life experiences as source material for his work.142
In analyzing the claim, the court first stated that the plaintiff
could establish an interference of use by showing that the defendant
had access to the idea and copied it.143 The court then stated that if
the plaintiff could show substantial similarity between the works, she
could establish an inference of use.144 The court did not analyze
access, because the defendant admitted to having read and retained
the plaintiff’s work.145 The court then explained that, when
examining the similarity prong, “[t]here is no bright line test for
determining whether two works are substantially similar.”146 The
court stated that its role was to assess whether a reasonable juror
could find the works substantially similar, and it concluded that a

138. Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23,
2009). Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore is not binding, it is indicative of the
issues materializing in the wake of Hollywood Screentest.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *10.
143. Id. at *3, *9.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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reasonable juror could not.147 After determining that there was no
substantial similarity between the works,148 the court took one final
step, holding that the defendant had demonstrated through
“uncontradicted evidence” that he independently created his work.149
Quoting Hollywood Screentest, the court held that the “defendant’s
evidence of independent creation [was] ‘clear, positive,
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it [could not] rationally be
disbelieved’ and, therefore, rebut[ted] an inference of use.”150
The court in Kightlinger erred in two respects in its analysis.151
First, it misstated the law when defining how one established an
inference of actual use.152 But more importantly, the court indulged
in an unnecessary review of the independent-creation defense and
misapplied it while doing so. Having concluded that there was no
substantial similarity between the two works—albeit through a
flawed analysis—the court refused to grant the plaintiff an inference
of actual use. Therefore, she failed to establish her prima facie case,
and the court should have upheld summary judgment for the
defendant on those grounds alone.

147. Id.
148. Id. at *6.
149. Id. at *9.
150. Id. at *10 (quoting Teich v. Gen. Mills, 339 P.2d 627,632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)).
151. It should be noted that the court also erred in a third way. The court, commenting on the
scènes à faire that were common to both works, stated that the “defendant most likely gathered
such ideas from the public domain . . . [and] conclude[d] [that] such scenes and references [could
not] and [did] not form a basis for finding substantial similarity.” Id. at *6. This conclusion that
non-novel scene-a-faires could not be used when comparing the two works’ similarities was
inaccurate. There is no requirement in California contract law that the ideas for which one seeks
recovery be novel; therefore, the court erroneously excluded them as evidence of substantial
similarity. See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Blaustein
v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a
contract need not be novel or concrete.”); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App.
1968); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (“We see no necessity to
add the elements of novelty and concreteness to implied-in-fact contracts with reference to
authors. Their status should be identically the same as that of any other person in any other
implied-in-fact contract situation.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06[B][2][b]
(“However, in 1957, the California Court of Appeal held that novelty is not a necessary element
in implied-in-fact contract cases.”).
152. See Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *3. The court improperly asserted that a showing
of substantial similarity would establish both access and copying. See id. Rather, it is similarity
and access that together establish an inference of use. Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No.
B190025, 2008 WL 588932, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008); Kulik, supra note 1, at 100.
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However, the court also went on to state that the defendant’s
evidence of independent creation was “uncontradicted.”153 If the
court based its conclusion on a finding that there was no inference of
actual use, then such a statement would have been appropriate.154
Instead, this holding was based on the proposition that the plaintiff
had not disputed any of the defendant’s underlying facts for his
defense.155 In this regard, not only did the court assign an improper
burden to the plaintiff, but the facts of the case did not support the
conclusion itself. First, in all past instances where the independentcreation defense had been successful, the defendant had shown that
he acquired the offending work from an independent third party.156
Here, the defendant allegedly created the screenplay himself.157
Therefore, as a matter of legal theory, the independent-creation
defense was entirely misplaced.158 Further, the plaintiff’s evidence
showed that the defendant had access to her work.159 All prior
assertions of successful independent-creation defenses succeeded
precisely because the independent creator proved that he had no
access to the plaintiff’s work.160 Thus, because of this misguided
application of the defense, this case displays how reliance on
Hollywood Screentest will further occlude the true meaning and
effect of the independent-creation defense.
4. Scottish American Media v. NBC Universal
A final example of the misapplication of the independentcreation defense occurred in Scottish American Media v. NBC

153. Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *10.
154. See id. (“Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that, in significant and material respects,
YOTD is based on events in his life and not on ideas in plaintiff’s screenplay.”).
155. See id. at *9 (“We hold that, under the particular facts of this case, defendant
demonstrated through uncontradicted evidence that he wrote and created [“The Year of the Dog”]
independent[ly].”).
156. See, e.g., Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d
279 (Ct. App. 2007); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982); Teich
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
157. Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *9.
158. See, e.g., Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d
279 (Ct. App. 2007); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982); Teich
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
159. See Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *1.
160. See supra Part IV.
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Universal.161 There, Maurice Fraser, who had no prior experience in
the entertainment industry,162 wrote a treatment for a song
competition titled “Battle of the States.”163 In June 2004, the plaintiff
pitched his idea to a man named Plestis via telephone, but was
unsuccessful.164 The plaintiff then contacted Silverman,165 who met
with the plaintiff.166 In this meeting, the plaintiff pitched his idea,
and Silverman pointed out that his idea was just like Eurovision, a
European television song competition.167 Silverman subsequently
rejected the plaintiff’s idea via e-mail, at which point the plaintiff
went to NBC in person and allegedly gave a copy of his treatment to
a new trainee, who allegedly promised to give it to Plestis.168 Later,
NBC and Reveille began developing a show called “American
Anthem,” prompting the plaintiff to file suit, believing it to be an
unlawful use of his idea.169
Not surprisingly, the defendants mounted an independentcreation defense in their motion for summary judgment.170 They
claimed that Silverman had come up with the idea to create an
American version of Eurovision in 2005, which he pitched to NBC
executive Jeff Zucker in June of that year.171 In order to avoid rights
issues, however, Silverman wanted to use the plaintiff’s treatment in
place of Eurovision.172 Silverman e-mailed NBC urging them to use
the plaintiff’s idea, but NBC responded that it preferred Eurovision,
at which point Silverman dropped the plaintiff’s concept.173
Silverman’s company then acquired the rights to Eurovision and

161. Scottish Am. Media, LLC v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. B205344, 2009 WL 1124942
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009). Although unpublished, this case demonstrates the improper
development of the independent-creation defense in California courts.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *2.
164. Id. at *3.
165. Ben Silverman also does business as “Ben Silverman Productions LLC doing business as
Reveille 1 and Reveille 2,” and is a television producer for domestic and foreign markets. Id. at
*1.
166. Id. at *3.
167. Id.
168. Id. Neither the trainee nor Plestis had any recollection of the plaintiff’s treatment. Id.
169. Id. at *5.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id. at *4.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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began working with NBC on the show.174 Ultimately, NBC decided
not to move forward with the project, and the show was never
produced, despite Silverman’s attempt to pitch it to other
networks.175
The court relied on Hollywood Screentest as guiding
precedent.176 It began its opinion by acknowledging the independentcreation defense, stating that because NBC obtained the rights to
Eurovision and put together a team, which developed the idea
without using the plaintiff’s work, the defendants did not use the
plaintiff’s treatment.177 The court then stated the following rule:
“Where [a] plaintiff conveys an idea to [a] defendant, and [the]
defendant produces a product similar to [the] plaintiff’s idea, an
inference arises that [the] defendant used [the] plaintiff’s idea. The
inference may be dispelled by evidence of independent creation of
defendant’s product.”178 The court then pointed out that the
plaintiff’s argument of unlawful use was based on similarities
between the two programs instead of on “evidence controverting
[the] defendants’ evidence of independent creation.”179 The court
further inferred that the plaintiff had developed his idea based on
Eurovision, and the court relied on copyright principles, holding that
“protection [did] not extend to . . . material traceable to common
sources.”180 In summation, the court relied on Hollywood Screentest,
holding:
[The] plaintiffs presented evidence of similarity sufficient
to raise an inference that [the] defendants used [the
plaintiff’s] idea. [The d]efendants dispelled the inference by
presenting evidence of independent creation of [the]
defendant’s show. [The p]laintiffs failed to provide any
evidence that call[ed] into question the evidence supporting
independent creation. The trial court therefore properly

174. Id. at *5.
175. Id. at *6.
176. Id. at *8.
177. Id. at *10.
178. Id. at *8 (citations omitted) (citing Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal,
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 290–91 (Ct. App. 2007)).
179. Id. at *10.
180. Id. (quoting Chase-Ribound v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1997)).
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adjudicated summarily [the] plaintiffs’ cause of action for
breach of implied contract.181
The court, relying on the overbroad language from the
Hollywood Screentest decision, misapplied both the law of ideas and
the independent-creation defense. First, the court mistakenly began
by analyzing the affirmative defense rather than the plaintiff’s prima
facie case.182 Had the court done its analysis properly, it would have
performed the requisite analysis of both substantial similarity and
access, which are absent from the opinion.183 Second, the court
imposed the concept of novelty, necessary in copyright, but
unnecessary in an implied-in-fact contract, to hold that any
similarities between the works were not due to the defendant’s use of
the plaintiff’s work but were instead due to both parties having used
common source material.184
Third, the court criticized the plaintiff’s evidentiary offering as
inadequate because he had done nothing to dispute the underlying
facts of the defendants’ affirmative defense, and it awarded summary
judgment for the defendant.185 Such reasoning was erroneous
because the court imposed a burden on the plaintiff not only to prove
his prima facie case but also to disprove the defendants’ affirmative
defense before ever reaching a jury.186 The potential
misinterpretation of the Hollywood Screentest holding described
above was realized in this opinion, for the court imposed on the
plaintiff the additional burden of disproving independent creation in
order to survive summary judgment.187 Here, actual use was a
disputed issue of fact. The plaintiff had presented evidence sufficient
to establish an inference of actual use,188 which when met with the
defendants’ independent-creation defense, created a disputed issue
that should have gone to the jury for resolution. Instead, the court
ignored this conflict and ruled that the plaintiff needed to provide

181. Id. at *11 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (citing Hollywood Screentest, 60
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 290–92).
182. See id. at *10.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 31–43.
184. See Scottish Am. Media, 2009 WL 1124942, at *10.
185. Id. at *11.
186. See supra Part IV.A.2.
187. See Scottish Am. Media, 2009 WL 1124942, at *11.
188. Id. at *10.
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evidence that called into question the defendants’ affirmative defense
in order to survive summary judgment.189
5. The Current Effect of the
Independent-Creation Defense
The above examples illustrate that California courts have
misapplied the independent-creation defense. Through their
unstructured analyses and overbroad language, courts have
seemingly stretched the defense far beyond its appropriate use.
Additionally, the very logic underlying the defense is inapposite to
basic principles of contract law.190 The Teich court, in recognizing
the independent-creation defense, sought to relieve idea recipients of
liability upon a showing that they did not actually use a plaintiff’s
idea.191 The effect of the defense, however, has been to
impermissibly allow defendants to escape valid contractual
obligations.192 As explained above, the existence of two contractual
obligations for the same service does not render one of those
contracts invalid by default.
Although the unsuitability of the independent-creation defense
highlights the problem, the defense itself is only part of a larger
problem—the inadministrable body of California idea law. As it
stands, California law not only potentially denies relief to deserving
idea purveyors, but it also stands to wrongfully punish innocent idea
recipients. This is so for one reason: when protection is afforded to
ideas that arguably have no distinguishable characteristics,193 there is
no clear method for determining if actual use of an idea has occurred.
This does not mean that purveyors of nonnovel and nonconcrete
189. Id. at *11.
190. See SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6.
191. See Teich v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627, 634–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
192. See supra Part IV.
193. See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Blaustein v.
Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a
contract need not be novel or concrete.”); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App.
1968); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (“We see no necessity to
add the elements of novelty and concreteness to implied-in-fact contracts with reference to
authors. Their status should be identically the same as that of any other person in any other
implied-in-fact contract situation.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06[B][2][b]
(“However, in 1957, the California Court of Appeal held that novelty is not a necessary element
in implied-in-fact contract cases.”). An idea that is neither novel nor concrete is arguably
indistinct from other similar ideas.
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ideas are not worthy of legal protection for their service of
disclosure, but rather that affording them such protection raises a
serious issue of administrability.
If proponents of the independent-creation defense wish for it to
be reliable, then the law must provide a jury with the tools necessary
to distinguish whether a work’s source was one distinct idea or
another.194 However, in California, where courts afford ideas
protection regardless of novelty and concreteness,195 there is no
guarantee that an idea will be uniquely identifiable within a
potentially infringing work. Stated differently, two seemingly
identical ideas from two different purveyors are currently presented
to a jury (1) as a plaintiff’s story of the creation and submission of
her idea—the implied-in-fact contract claim—and (2) as the
defendant’s equally compelling story of the creation of the work
from another idea—the independent-creation defense.196 The two
ideas—or single idea with two sources—likely appear
interchangeable in the eyes of a jury, rendering the independentcreation defense useless to negate the element of actual use and
leading to both juror confusion and unpredictable verdicts.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
All hope is not lost, however. Two possible solutions can
resolve the conflicts between the independent-creation defense and
contract policies197 and can mitigate the uncertainty and
inadministrability created by the current inconsistencies in the law of
ideas. The first solution proposes a reform of the analysis that courts
currently (ideally) apply to Desny claims. The second solution leaves
the current body of law intact but instead suggests alterations to the
effect of the independent-creation defense and the remedies to which
one is entitled. While both proposals offer relief, ultimately this Note
argues that the former is preferred in order to remedy the theoretical
inconsistencies in the current body of law.
194. See Casido, supra note 15, at 338; Kulik, supra note 1, at 107 (“In a number of appellate
decisions it has been recognized that actual use will rarely, if ever, be susceptible of proof by
direct evidence. Instead, ‘use’ of the idea by the defendant is almost always proven
circumstantially.”).
195. Benay, 607 F.3d at 629; Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 44–51.
197. Michaud & Tulquois, supra note 9, at 77.
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A. Novelty as to the Recipient
The first proposed solution alters the idea-disclosure analysis
performed in implied-in-fact contract disputes. Stated plainly,
California courts should presume that the parties negotiated the
implied-in-fact contract on the following terms: the idea purveyor
promised to disclose an idea that was novel as to the recipient in
exchange for payment from the recipient in the event of actual use.
The additional presumption of “novelty as to the recipient” better
protects idea recipients from multiple lawsuits for the same idea
submission, while still protecting the idea purveyors’ right to enforce
a specifically negotiated contract for the disclosure of an idea that
was not novel.
“Novelty as to the recipient” is not to be confused with
unqualified novelty.198 This proposed standard would establish that a
common and unoriginal idea, as long as it was unknown to the idea
recipient prior to disclosure, would satisfy the terms of the impliedin-fact contract.199 The functional result of this standard would be to
protect an idea recipient from accumulating contractual obligations
with every party who pitched him the “same” idea. He or she would,
therefore, be bound only to compensate the first idea purveyor in the
event of actual use, for that purveyor would have been the only one
who satisfied the contractual term of novelty as to the recipient.
It is also important to note that this proposed term is merely a
rebuttable presumption; it is malleable depending on the factual
circumstances and will not stand as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s
recovery. Unlike a required element that ideas be novel as to the
world before one can even establish his or her prima facie case, 200 a
presumption just shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to
overcome the presumed term of novelty as to the recipient.
Therefore, it is a lesser burden on the plaintiff in two respects: (1)
either novelty must only be shown as to one person instead of the
whole world or (2) the nonnovelty contractual term must be
198. Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 147 (1954).
199. Id.
200. Kulik, supra note 1, at 102 (“[T]he notion that novelty is not a prerequisite is a major
distinction between California law and New York law, which continues to require novelty and
originality.”); see also Miller, supra note 1, at 727 (“[A]rticulations of the novelty requirement
establish a threshold barrier demonstrating a longstanding unwillingness to allow the factfinding
function of an actual trial to take place.”).
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established, rather than not even being an option. Further, this
proposed presumption merely acts as a tool for better administering
legal relief as a tribunal attempts to identify the terms of a contract,
rather than as an inappropriate inquiry into the adequacy of the
consideration between contracting parties.201
As one court stated, “There is nothing unreasonable in the
assumption that a producer would obligate himself to pay for the
disclosure of an idea which he would otherwise be legally free to
use, but which in fact, he would be unable to use but for the
disclosure.”202 The alternate view presented here is that there is
similarly nothing unreasonable in the assumption that a producer
would obligate himself to pay only for the disclosure of an idea with
which he was not already familiar.203 Further, upon an adequate
evidentiary showing, a plaintiff could still rebut the presumption and
establish that the contract was for the disclosure of an idea not novel
to the recipient. The idea of a presumed term, rather than an absolute
term, acknowledges and respects that where there is a contract for an
idea, which does not by its terms require novelty, there is no
justification for imposing such a term.204
If California courts adopt this presumed term into the analytical
framework of a Desny claim, the independent-creation defense will
become logically sound. Whichever idea purveyor contracts with the
recipient first—i.e., discloses his idea to the recipient first—will be
the only party to whom the recipient owes compensation in the event
of actual use, for only the first party will have satisfied the term of
novelty as to the recipient. Such an idea hearkens back to the
common law protection afforded to land owners in a real property
dispute, in that “first in time is first in right.”205
Of course, the concern of idea purveyors will be that such a
presumption will be impossible to overcome. Arguably, any idea
201. In California, it is well settled that the conveyance of an idea can serve as valid
consideration, regardless of novelty or concreteness. Literary and Artistic Property, supra note 9,
§ 16; see also Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 273 (Cal. 1956) (“It is not essential to recovery that
plaintiff's story or synopsis possess the elements of copyright protectibility [sic] if the fact of
consensual contract be found.”).
202. Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970).
203. See Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
204. See Nimmer, supra note 198, at 145.
205. See United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
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recipient could escape a contractual obligation by simply claiming
that he was already familiar with the idea, especially if it is a wellknown idea. The effect of this presumed term is not intended,
however, to allow an idea recipient to shield himself from all
liability. Rather, it only protects the recipient from undeserved
liability where he or she has not actually used the plaintiff’s idea. As
such, it is a method for shielding idea recipients from liability to
multiple idea purveyors.
A plaintiff can simply rebut the idea recipient’s claim of
nonnovelty by pointing to the mere fact that the defendant chose to
use the idea subsequent to disclosure.206 This temporal element will
evidence that the idea was novel as to the recipient, because he had
not used it before disclosure.207 As has been recognized in California
courts, the timing of an idea disclosure can be the very element that
imbues value on the underlying idea.208 If a jury then refuses to
recognize that a plaintiff’s idea was novel to and actually used by the
defendant, it seems only fitting that the plaintiff would not be entitled
to recover in that instance. If a plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to
persuade a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor, a denial of
relief would not be unjust.
B. Fractional Damage Awards
The second proposed solution leaves the entirety of the
California law of ideas intact but, instead, modifies the effect of the
independent-creation defense. As it stands today, a successful
defense is a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.209 However, as
established above, this unlawfully extinguishes some valid
contractual claims.210 The proposition here is that the effect of an
independent-creation defense should be modeled after the tort
concept of pure comparative negligence, which would offer
206. See Nimmer, supra note 198, at 146.
207. An idea recipient might argue that such a “timing” model places an undue burden on the
idea recipient to read all idea submissions to avoid possible liability if he independently
developed a similar show subsequent to receipt. This is easily remedied, however, by requiring
that idea purveyors sign industry-standard releases, relinquishing their rights and acknowledging
that no implied-in-fact contract has been created by mere submission. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 19D.10; Brophy, supra note 2, at 526–27.
208. Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1966).
209. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90.

Summer 2012]

A RECIPE FOR EVADING

1451

proportional relief to both parties.211 Although such a solution does
not remedy the legal inconsistencies discussed in this Note and is
therefore less effective, it at least equitably distributes the burdens
imposed under the current state of the law.
If the plaintiff establishes the existence of his implied-in-fact
contract and further gains the inference of actual use, it logically
follows that he is entitled to recovery. If the defendant then
establishes, via independent creation, that he has contracted with
another party for the same idea, it logically follows that he could
escape a proportion of his obligation to the plaintiff based on the
amount that he actually used both his independent, third-party idea
and the plaintiff’s idea. The court would, of course, present this
question to the jury to assess the degrees to which each idea was
used in creating the final offending work.212
Implementing such a system would strike a compromise
between the interests of both idea purveyors and idea recipients, for
it affords the purveyor protection and protects the recipient from
unreasonably paying multiple damages for the same conduct.213 The
frequent method for damage calculation in idea-submission claims is
restitution.214 If a court determines the amount that a plaintiff is
entitled to recover by the amount that his idea enriched a defendant,
then it is fitting that he should only be able to recover the precise
amount that his idea actually enriched the defendant. It is not

211. Under a system of pure comparative negligence, when calculating damages in a
negligence action, responsibility and liability for damage are assigned in direct proportion to the
amount of negligence of each of the parties. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal.
1975). The result of applying this system is that “the damages awarded shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.” Id. An analogous
system in implied-in-fact contract recovery would then award damages to a plaintiff in proportion
to the amount of actual use of his idea that is attributable to the defendant, while relieving the
defendant of any further liability to that party. The remaining “actual idea use” liability would be
attributable to either the defendant’s use of his own idea or his use of a third party’s idea. For
example, if one idea with three sources is used by one defendant, he will be held liable to each of
the three idea purveyors in proportion to the amount he actually used each plaintiff’s idea.
212. See id. at 1240.
213. “At issue in every idea submission case are the interests of two competing classes: those
who conceive and submit ideas and those who receive and use them. Inevitably, decisions must
chart a course that balances the rights and obligations of each class.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 19D.07[A].
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (2010); see Kulik, supra note 1, at 108.
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necessary that recovery in these cases be an all-or-nothing
proposition.
Idea recipients might be staunchly opposed to such a solution
because they would have no way of truncating litigation—and
litigation costs—by prevailing in a suit at the summary judgment
phase. However, as mentioned above, there are standard industry
practices that protect idea recipients from litigation in the first
place—releases.215 One cannot overlook that the only reason that
there is room for a plaintiff to bring an idea theft claim is, generally,
because a defendant did not take steps to protect himself in the first
place. The answer to eliminating litigation costs for the idea
recipients, who are the unwilling participants in such suits, is not to
eliminate the idea purveyor’s right to file suit, but rather to
incentivize the idea recipient to (1) avoid unlawfully using a
plaintiff’s ideas and (2) take anticipatory steps to protect himself.
In addition, the idea purveyor is in no position to protect herself,
for it is rare that a network executive would ever agree to sign a
nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement.216 The entertainment
industry is already difficult enough to break into, and any network,
when faced with resistance from an idea purveyor, would simply
forego the submission and move on to the next of the thousand ideas
coming across its desks.217 As between the innocent idea purveyor
and the network, the network is the party that has caused harm by
using the idea without compensation, and thus it should incur the
loss. To hold otherwise would unjustly enrich the defendant network
for the value of the idea purveyor’s services.
Economically speaking, imposing “comparative liability” for
failure to pay contracted idea purveyors will have the positive effect
of incentivizing networks to engage in negotiations and development
with only those parties in whose ideas they have genuine interest.
This will save many idea purveyors time and money, as they will be
less likely to be misled by a network for years only to be met with
rejection. Further, unless comparative liability is imposed on the
networks, idea purveyors will be disincentivized from submitting
ideas for fear of idea theft. There would be no recourse for breach of
215. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.10; Brophy, supra note 2, at 526–27.
216. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 697–98.
217. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 280 (Cal. 1956) (Carter, J., concurring).
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their implied-in-fact contracts in the wake of an independent-creation
defense. The entertainment industry would collapse without the
constant influx of fresh ideas, for, as the defendants will certainly
agree, they rely on the contributions of idea purveyors for their
economic survival.218
Moreover, if there is no liability imposed for the breach of valid
implied-in-fact contracts, the court would essentially be taxing a
class of idea purveyors and forcing them to subsidize the idea
recipients’ pursuit of new and fresh media programming. It is not
unreasonable to ask entertainment companies to pay for the ideas that
purveyors present to them and that lead to television programs and
films. It is, however, unreasonable to deny the unfortunate person
with a valid implied-in-fact contract his compensation because the
network previously or subsequently contracted with another party for
an identical idea.219 The law should not permit an idea recipient to
simply choose which contractual obligations it will honor and which
it will not. The court has a responsibility to uphold the freedom of
contract and enforce an idea recipient’s contractual obligations to
idea purveyors.
VI. CONCLUSION
If left unchanged, the protection that California courts afford to
idea purveyors runs the risk of being both underinclusive and
overinclusive due to its inconsistencies. Therefore, courts must adopt
one of the above solutions. Only one of them seems to adequately
protect the interests of both idea purveyors and recipients alike:
novelty as to the recipient. The analytical framework of implied-infact contracts must itself be changed in order to remedy the
theoretical inconsistencies between the independent-creation defense
and California idea law. Only then will businesses be able to
structure their future ventures in order to avoid liability. Only then

218. See Brophy, supra note 2, at 508 (“[I]n the current media landscape dominated by reality
television, a raw unscripted idea can have considerable value even before it is ever reduced to its
final tangible expression.”); Miller, supra note 1, at 711–12.
219. See Desny, 299 P.2d at 267 (“The person who can and does convey a valuable idea to a
producer who commercially solicits the service or who voluntarily accepts it knowing that it is
tendered for a price should likewise be entitled to recover.”).
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will future litigants be able to better strategize and predict the
outcomes of their disputes.
While fractional damage awards might enable parties to avoid
paying multiple damages, the present theoretical inconsistencies
would still remain. Idea recipients would potentially be locked into
nuisance suits, and idea purveyors would potentially be denied
rightful recovery because of a misapplied independent-creation
defense. Moreover, parties would get no relief from their litigation
costs if courts adopt such a solution. While fractional damage awards
may appear just, in practice, litigants would be paying for the same
number of billable hours only to be awarded or penalized with
reduced damage awards or liabilities.
In conclusion, through the incorporation of the presumed term of
novelty as to the recipient, the independent-creation defense will gain
theoretical validity in the context of California contract law. This
solution will ensure that a defendant with a valid independentcreation defense from a previous idea disclosure presumably escapes
undue liability, while upholding the basic principles of contract.
Likewise, idea purveyors will benefit, for no longer will the improper
application of the independent-creation defense render their valid
implied-in-fact contracts valueless.

